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OVERVIEW AND MACROECONOMIC ISSUES
KOREA’S ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS
By Pyo Hak-kil
Per Capita Income Greater Than $20,000
According to a preliminary estimate by the Bank of 
Korea on 4 January 2008, Korea’s per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) and per capita gross national 
income (GNI), which adjusts GDP for changes in terms 
of trade, exceeded $20,000 by the end of 2007. This 
was achieved mainly through the rapid appreciation of 
the won from a rate of 1,011 won per dollar as of end 
of 2005 to 900.7 won per dollar at the end of October 
2007, as the growth rate of real GDP in 2007 was 
estimated to be less than 5 percent. Korea appears to 
be the only formerly colonized nation that has thus far 
surpassed the per capita income level of $20,000.
Korea’s per capita GNI passed the $10,000 mark in 
1995, when it reached $11,432, but plummeted to 
$7,355 in 1998 after the fi nancial crisis. It started to 
recover in 2000, when it reached $10,841. It was dur-
ing the Roh Moo-hyun government that per capita GNI 
increased from $11,497 (2002) to $20,000. Thus, the 
Roh government must be credited with this remark-
able achievement. In addition to growth in per capita 
income, there were other economic achievements. 
They include price stability and a surplus in the trade 
balance, which are often main macroeconomic policy 
targets for any open economy. The Roh government 
should also be credited for initiating free trade agree-
ments with Japan, the United States, and the European 
Union.
In response to President-elect Lee Myung-bak’s claim 
that Korea must recover from economic stagnation, 
President Roh argued that there was nothing wrong 
with the current state of the Korean economy and, 
therefore, that there is nothing to recover from. Nev-
ertheless, the issue of economic recovery or revitaliza-
tion was a dominant one throughout the presidential 
campaign in 2007, and the major opposition party 
candidate, Lee Myung-bak, early in his campaign 
seized on this public perception and managed to win 
election despite a great deal of negative campaigning 
and personal scandal.
Immiserizing Growth and Polarization
The question arises as to why average Koreans have 
been distressed and were not happy with the economic 
performance by the Roh government even though the 
macroeconomic fundamentals have been seemingly 
sound, with per capita GNI increasing at an average 
annual rate of 2.7 percent, a mild infl ation rate of 2.9 
percent in terms of the consumer price index, and a 
continuing current account surplus during the past 
fi ve years.
First, the average annual growth of the economy (4.4 
percent for real GDP and 2.7 percent for real GNI) was 
below the level of the economy’s potential growth. 
Economists at Korea Development Institute estimated 
in 2002 that Korea’s potential GDP growth rate during 
the period 2003–07 would be around 5.5 percent, and 
a study by the Bank of Korea in 2005 estimated the 
country’s growth at the 5.4–6.0 percent level for the 
period 2000–10. At the time of the International Mon-
etary Fund consultation in November 2006, I estimated 
that the country’s growth would be at the 6.0–6.5 per-
cent level. Thus, the Korean economy did not live up to 
its potential even though there are differing estimates 
of the extent of the GDP gap. In addition, the average 
growth rate of real GNI was much less than that of real 
GDP because of the continued worsening of the terms 
of trade index, which declined from 100 in the base 
year of 2000 to 68.6 by the end of September 2007. In 
other words, the general feeling of the Korean public 
is that the economy has become less vibrant because 
of the lack of growth in real income.
Second, the economy’s growth during the Roh ad-
ministration was not driven by investment but by a 
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government-initiated construction boom and extraor-
dinary export growth (17.9 percent average growth on 
a customs clearance basis) in a few sectors including 
automobiles, semiconductors, ship building, com-
munications equipment, and iron and steel products. 
During the Roh administration, the average growth 
rate of real investment was only 3.4 percent, which is 
well below the average growth rate of real GDP (4.8 
percent).
During previous governments in Korea before the 
fi nancial crisis, the average growth rates of real invest-
ment had always been well above and usually double 
the average growth rate of real GDP. For example, the 
average growth rate of real GDP during the precrisis 
period of 1985–97 was 8.1 percent, and it was mainly 
supported by higher growth rates of real investment 
on machinery and equipment, which averaged 11.8 
percent. In short, the quality and sources of growth 
were not sound enough to warrant the public percep-
tion of improvement in economic well-being. I would 
defi ne this phenomenon as a kind of “immiserizing 
growth syndrome,” an expression that has been used 
by international trade theorists to defi ne a pattern of 
growth that lacks signifi cant real income growth as a 
consequence of worsening terms of trade or capital 
fl ight by foreign investors.
Third, while economic fundamentals remain seem-
ingly sound, average Koreans have been deeply dis-
tressed by worsening income and wealth distribution, 
mainly caused by the failure of the Roh government’s 
real estate policy. The failure began with the fulfi ll-
ment of one of the government’s populist campaign 
agenda items, which was the relocation of important 
administrative functions from Seoul to Chungwon 
in Choongnam Province. The relocation of the head-
quarters of more than 100 public corporations and 
enterprises from Seoul to remote localities under the 
slogan of a “balanced national land development plan” 
was another example that lacked economic feasibility 
and effi ciency for these public entities. Some of these 
projects’ groundbreaking ceremonies were hurriedly 
launched before the Lee government was inaugurated 
so that there could be no backtracking in the plans.
The unwarranted development and relocation projects 
have been core factors behind the hyperinfl ation in real 
estate prices, particularly in the Seoul metropolitan 
area. With October 2003 as the base index of 100, 
sales prices of Seoul apartments rose to the level of 
140 by the end of September 2007. Real estate prices 
increased at an annual rate of 24.1 percent in 2006 
alone. During the same period, sales prices of housing 
nationwide went up by 18 percent, and the cost to lease 
a Seoul apartment went up by 15 percent.
There are two main factors behind this unprecedented 
housing price hike. One is the speculative reinvestment 
by those who obtained windfall land compensation 
money, which was estimated to be more than 64 tril-
lion won. The other is the rent-seeking money for 
redevelopment projects that often have been subject 
to uneven deregulation policies by the city govern-
ment. In fact, the failure of the real estate stabilization 
policy by the Roh government ruined the government’s 
legitimacy by polarizing both income and wealth dis-
tribution, and it ultimately led to the powerlessness of 
the government toward the end of the Roh presidency. 
In some sense, the ultimate responsibility of the new 
Lee government is rectifying and consolidating the 
unfi nished agendas and rampant development projects 
of the Roh government.
Unfi nished Agenda of the Roh Government
The year 2007 was the last full year in offi ce for Presi-
dent Roh, who was inaugurated in February 2003 after 
an unanticipated upset victory over Lee Hoi-chang. 
The presidential election on 19 December 2007 elected 
candidate Lee Myung-bak by a large margin over the 
ruling party candidate, Chung Dong-young. President-
elect Lee served as mayor of Seoul before he launched 
his presidential campaign. Because of his leadership 
in the Chunggechun project (a revitalization project 
of a downtown water channel) and Seoul’s traffi c 
improvement plans, he led in the public polls among 
presidential candidates throughout 2007. His slogan 
of “economic revival” seems to have persuaded the 
voters who were much distressed by stagnant recovery 
and skyrocketing housing prices and resulting high 
property taxes.
In retrospect, it can be seen that the Roh government 
inherited the Kim Dae-jung government (1998–2002) 
in many respects. It adopted Kim’s engagement or 
conciliatory policy toward North Korea and an eco-
nomic policy in favor of better income distribution 
rather than a growth-oriented policy. Roh and Kim 
shared a reform-oriented national agenda of trying to 
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undo everything and topple the power of the so-called 
establishment. Even though the political opposition 
called the tenure of the two regimes “left-wing govern-
ments” and Korea’s “lost decade,” it seems premature 
to evaluate their achievements and failure.
One positive aspect of political economy developed 
during the past decade or so was a more transpar-
ent system of political contributions and election 
management. The two special prosecutors who were 
appointed to investigate the so-called BBK scandal 
and Samsung scandal symbolize the election year’s 
negative campaigns on the one hand, but on the other 
they also refl ect strong public sentiment for higher 
moral standards for political and business leaders 
in Korea. The consequences of the two probes will 
greatly infl uence the general election for the National 
Assembly in April 2008 and the political stability of 
the new Lee government.
Pending Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
On 30 June 2007, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment (KORUS FTA) was signed after eight rounds 
of negotiations lasting 10 months. The agreement 
consists of 24 chapters, with a signifi cant reduction 
in tariffs on industrial and agricultural products. It 
also includes the provisions specifi ed in a bipartisan 
agreement on trade reached between the U.S. ad-
ministration and the U.S. Congress on 10 May 2007, 
which addresses internationally recognized standards 
and principles on labor and environmental protection. 
The Korean economy is now the 11th largest in the 
world, and Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner 
of the United States, with an annual GDP of nearly 
$1 trillion dollars, and a two-way U.S.-Korea trade 
volume of $78 billion in 2006. The U.S. International 
Trade Commission has estimated that the overall U.S. 
GDP is expected to increase as much as $11.9 billion 
because of the KORUS FTA. The KORUS FTA will 
be the largest and commercially most signifi cant FTA 
for the United States in more than a decade and the fi rst 
one for the United States in Northeast Asia.
Ratifi cation of the agreement is pending because of 
political reasons on the both sides. On the Korean side, 
ratifi cation was proposed by the Roh administration 
in September 2007 but was stalled owing to Korea’s 
presidential election on 19 December 2007; it contin-
ues to be uncertain because of Korea’s general election 
for the National Assembly coming up in April 2008. 
On the U.S. side, there will be a presidential election in 
November 2008; therefore, if the Congress is to ratify 
the agreement in 2008, the Bush administration needs 
to submit it to Congress at the latest by March 2008 
because of the congressional rule requiring submission 
of bills 90 days before congressional decision. Because 
of the election in the United States in November 2008, 
after July 2008 the U.S. Congress will be in session 
only for limited periods.
At the present time, the two major candidates of the 
Democratic Party, Senator Barack Obama and Senator 
Hillary Clinton, are opposing the ratifi cation of the 
U.S.-Korea FTA. Because of the uncertainty, the Bush 
administration has not been able to submit the bill for 
ratifi cation. With this tight schedule in mind, Korea’s 
newly inaugurated Lee administration will push for-
ward the ratifi cation before or after Korea’s general 
election by opening the country to imports of the U.S. 
beef, further following less strict import criteria set by 
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). The 
issue of importing U.S. beef has been identifi ed as a 
major congressional ratifi cation bottleneck.
Political Economy of Deregulation and the 
Grand Canal Project
Newly elected President Lee is expected to push 
forward a policy package for economic revitalization 
and the Grand Canal Project promised during his 
campaign. A policy package for economic recovery 
and restoring competitiveness includes deregulation 
of investment constraints imposed on large conglom-
erates and the elimination of the separation between 
industrial capital and fi nancial capital. So far, the 
Korean government has been relying on two policy 
instruments to limit the economic power of the coun-
try’s major conglomerates, the chaebol. One is the 
Fair Trade Act, which has served not only an antitrust 
function but also as an investment-control scheme for 
major conglomerates in excess of a stipulated level of 
assets. The other is the prohibition on major industrial 
capital owning banking capital. The new government 
will try to abolish both types of investment-related 
regulations to promote both competition and effi -
ciency. In the past, it has been argued that these two 
policy instruments have put domestic conglomerates 
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at a disadvantage compared with foreign capital, as 
witnessed in the Lone Star investment case, which is 
still in dispute. 
A set of pro-business policies will certainly help revi-
talize domestic demand for investment, but there have 
been reasons for maintaining such restrictive policies. 
Critics have argued that it is premature to remove the 
restrictive policies because corporate transparency in 
ownership and management in Korea is still below 
global standards, and the practice of cross-ownership 
and cross-investment among both listed subsidiaries 
and unlisted fi rms has not been reduced since the fi -
nancial crisis of 1997–98. Critics also argue that major 
conglomerates have already penetrated nonbank fi nan-
cial businesses, including merchant banking, lease and 
credit card businesses, and insurance and banking with 
limited or disguised ownership, and, therefore, that 
the full opening of all banks to ownership by major 
conglomerates is too risky given the public and prudent 
nature of the banking business.
The new Lee government wants to privatize public 
banks such as Korea Development Bank and Woori 
Bank, which has received injections of public funds 
since 1998. In this context, it is more likely that such 
deregulation is pursued step by step so that banks can 
be owned not by a single conglomerate but by the 
syndicated capital of multiple conglomerates. Another 
dimension of this issue is the Lee government’s labor 
relations. The Korea Confederation of Trade Unions 
(Minju Nochong) did not endorse the Lee candidacy 
although the Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(Hankuk Nochong) did. The former has already an-
nounced that it cannot endorse the new government’s 
pro-business policies and may rely on more hard-line 
policies, including nationwide strikes. The traditional 
split between the two labor organizations will make 
deregulation and privatization measures more compli-
cated. In fact, the so-called public sector reform plans 
under both the Kim and the Roh governments failed 
owing to labor disputes and agency problems in most 
of the public enterprises and quasi-public banks and 
institutions.
The Grand Canal Project, a symbolic cornerstone 
project of the president-elect during his campaign, is 
likely to bring more controversy than any other policy 
measure. The project envisions building a long canal 
system along the central mountain corridors, link-
ing the Han River in Seoul to the Nakdong River in 
the Taegu area as well as to the southeastern Honam 
area. Proponents of the proposed project argue that 
the canal will aid river transport and ease the burden 
on highways and railroads; it will also improve water 
management and tourism. Opponents question the 
economic feasibility of the project and voice envi-
ronmental concerns. If the project is to be completed 
within the term of the Lee presidency, it will have to 
be launched during 2008. To avoid debate on its eco-
nomic feasibility, the new government is expected to 
propose private participation in the project in the form 
of either build-to-transfer or build-to-manage. Critics 
argue, however, that no private investor will participate 
unless it either is subsidized or receives guarantees by 
the government or is given unfair privileges of land 
development along the canal. This will become a hot 
topic during the elections for the National Assembly 
in April 2008.
Target of 6 Percent Growth
According to fi gures released in the fi rst week of 
January 2008 by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
import prices in 2007 rose at their fastest rate (10.9 
percent) in the 25 years since recording these data 
began in 1982, underlining the threat of stagfl ation as 
the United States enters a period of slower economic 
growth. The price of petroleum imports rose by 50 
percent during 2007 while nonpetroleum import prices 
rose by 3 percent. Meanwhile, the subprime mortgage 
crisis and housing slump are likely to have reduced 
U.S. economic growth during the last quarter in 2007 
to 2 percent, down from 4.9 percent in the third quarter 
of the year. On 10 January 2008, Ben Bernanke, Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve, hinting at further rate cuts, 
said the U.S. central bank planned to act aggressively 
to offset the risks to growth. President George W. 
Bush is reported to be proposing tax relief of $145 
billion in the form of a one-time tax rebate of up to 
$800 for individuals and $1,600 for married couples 
because such a fi scal stimulus hands money directly to 
consumers so that there will be less waste of time and 
money. Democratic presidential candidates are already 
pushing for higher benefi ts and public spending. But 
there will be limits to expansionary policies because 
the banks are worried about liquidity and default risks, 
while consumers are faced with higher infl ation and 
reduced values of their property.
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In Korea, the new Lee administration will be at-
tempting to achieve 6 percent growth of real GDP in 
2008, which is lower than the average growth target 
of 7 percent for fi ve years that Lee promised dur-
ing his campaign. But 7 percent is higher than the 
consensus rate (4.5–5.0 percent) predicted by most 
private research institutes. If a U.S. recession materi-
alizes during the fi rst half of 2008, Korea’s 6 percent 
growth target will be diffi cult to achieve because both 
domestic consumption and exports, which have been 
supporting GDP growth through their average growth 
rates of 2.6 percent and 17.9 percent, respectively, 
during the period 2003–07 are likely to slow down 
because of infl ation and the greatly appreciated won. 
Even if high growth is achieved by fi scal expansion, 
tax reduction, and decreased regulation of conglom-
erates, it may take place amid higher infl ation and a 
more stagnant economy. 
The real estate policy of Korea’s new government 
already seems to be challenged signifi cantly by the 
recent movement of real estate prices. The owners of 
high-priced housing and redevelopment projects are 
hoarding their properties to avoid the current high 
property taxes and capital gains taxes in anticipation 
of tax reductions by the new government in the com-
ing year. This means the supply of housing will be 
constrained, and there could be another round of real 
estate speculation.
Finally, the dismal prospect for resolution of the 
North Korean nuclear issue caused by North Korea’s 
failure to conform with the stipulated deadline of 31 
December 2007 adds another negative prospect for 
2008. Since the 2007 presidential election, North 
Korea has been silent on the South-North relations. 
The presidential election process in the United States, 
which has just begun, might favor a hard-line policy 
toward North Korea.
The uncertain prospects for South-North relations and 
the six-party talks may cloud the new government’s 
effort to revitalize the Korean economy. Therefore, the 
new Lee administration may have to face much harder 
economic realities than expected because institutional 
deregulation cannot be accomplished overnight; also, 
changes also often come with other distortions. The 
aspects of political economy surrounding the proposed 
Grand Canal Project and South-North relations are 
quite uncertain.
Prospects for Sustainable Growth and 
Policy Implications
According to my recent estimation using the Korea 
Industrial Productivity (KIP) database and the EU 
KLEMS Project database (March 2007 version),1 the 
international comparison of long-run growth and its 
decomposition lead us to an optimistic conclusion. The 
study shows that, during the period 1981–95, the mar-
ket economy portion of real GDP in the United States, 
Japan, and Korea increased at an average annual rate of 
3.0 percent, 3.6 percent, and 9.4 percent, respectively. 
During the period 1996–04, which includes Japan’s 
“lost decade,” Korea’s fi nancial crisis, and the U.S.-
initiated boom in information technology, the average 
annual growth rates of real GDP were 3.7 percent, 0.7 
percent, and 4.9 percent, respectively.
The growth decomposition reveals a more interesting 
fact: All three of these economies suffered from aging 
and a reduction of working hours. The growth rates 
of labor input decreased in the United States from 1.2 
percent to 0.7 percent, in Japan from 0.5 percent to -0.4 
percent, and in Korea from 1.9 percent to 0.7 percent 
during the corresponding two subperiods. While the 
growth rates of capital input declined in Japan from 1.9 
percent to 0.7 percent and in Korea from 5.5 percent 
to 3.3 percent, the growth rate of U.S. capital input 
increased from 1.1 percent to 1.4 percent. 
The measure of overall economic effi ciency, which 
is defi ned as total factor productivity (TFP) and mea-
sured as a residual after deducting the contribution of 
labor and capital input from GDP growth, reveals the 
same pattern as that of capital input. While the growth 
rates of TFP declined in Japan and Korea from 1.2 
percent to 0.4 percent and from 2.0 percent to 0.9 per-
cent, respectively, the growth rate in the United States 
increased from 0.7 percent to 1.6 percent. During the 
period 1996–2004, the relative contribution of TFP to 
GDP growth in the United States was more than 50 
 
1. Pyo Hak-kil, Hyunbae Chun, and Keunhee Rhee, Total Factor Productivity by 72 Industries in Korea and International Comparison 
(Seoul: Bank of Korea, February 2008).
6 THE KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE
percent while its relative contribution in Korea was 
less than 20 percent. In Japan, the relative contribution 
of TFP was more than 50 percent, but it was meaning-
less because Japan’s GDP growth rate (0.7 percent) 
was very low during the period.
As outlined above, even though the prospects for 
Korea’s economic recovery in 2008 are uncertain 
owing to the domestic political economy and the 
threat of stagfl ation in the world economy caused by 
subprime mortgage problems and high oil prices, the 
medium-term growth prospect of the Korean economy 
seems quite sound and stable if the new government 
introduces a set of policies that are designed for re-
storing growth momentum and competitive potential 
rather than short-sighted populist policies. Such a set 
of growth policies may invite criticism from different 
political interest groups, and the public may become 
impatient about the speed of recovery, but clinging to 
the populist agenda is likely to ruin the ultimate policy 
goal of the new government, which is restoring growth 
momentum and national competitiveness.
The new government should redesign its policy pack-
age and its priorities independent of campaign prom-
ises and embedded political interests. The advantage 
of a single-term presidency is its limited time horizon, 
and, therefore, it is necessary to persuade the public 
to help restore the national agenda for a resumption 
of sustainable growth and national competitiveness 
rather than seek windfall gains and short-run incen-
tives. In this respect, the policy directives of the new 
Lee government must restore investment potential 
and upgrade the overall effi ciency of the economy 
through consistent deregulation, enhanced invest-
ments in research and development, and institutional 
reforms in education and social welfare rather than 
insist on short-sighted populist election agendas such 
as unwarranted development projects. Learning from 
the failures of the Roh regime will be the best lesson 
for the new administration.
Dr. Pyo is Professor of Economics and Director of the 
Center for National Competitiveness, Seoul National 
University.
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